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The cumulative effect of ten years of European Union (EU) policies on migration is an
overriding emphasis on control at the borders and beyond the borders of EU states
through a series of measures: carriers’ liability, stricter visa requirements, readmission
treaties with Central and Eastern European states and electronically fortified borders. As
several case studies have shown, trying to keep economic migrants out has had, among
others, the side effect of allowing for the development of networks of human smugglers
(Koser 1997; McDowell 1997; Salt and Stein 1997; Ghosh 1998; Messe et al. 1998;
Morrison 1998; Van Hear 1998; Koslowski 2000; Peter 2000; Salt and Hogarth 2000;
Snyder 2000). While migration control policies have not specifically targeted asylum
seekers, they have, nevertheless, affected them in much the same way as other groups of
migrants, forcing them to resort to illegal migration to reach Western Europe and
therefore criminalizing them in blatant contradiction with international law governing
the status of refugees (Engbersen and van der Lun 1998; Van Hear 1998).
In 2000, the UN adopted a Protocol against human smuggling, testifying to the growing
concern by state authorities and international organizations who view migrant
smuggling and trafficking as undermining international collaborative efforts to produce
ordered migration flows.1 In the 1990s, the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) conducted a vast policy-oriented research programme on the topic, which was
also the subject of several academic studies (IOM 1994; IOM 1995; Ghosh 1998; Meese
et al. 1998; Salt and Hogarth 2000; Snyder 2000). Salt and Stein (1997) even devised a
model for analysing smuggling as a business, dividing it into three stages: the
mobilization and recruitment of migrants in their countries of origin, their movement en
route along transit stages, their integration into labour markets and societies in the host
countries. Despite contributing rich documentary and theoretical perspectives on a new
field, the various approaches adopted in these studies have three major limitations. First,
when considering the transit process of irregular migrants originating from developing
countries, they are almost all located at the gateway of Western industrialized states and
leave the first stages of migration and smuggling in the shadow. Second, even the very
few that document smuggling in one transit country in the South take for granted that
migrants from developing countries systematically aim at reaching the West from the
beginning of their migration. Third, like the policies that allow smuggling rings to thrive
and that criminalize migrants whatever their profile, these studies do not clearly
differentiate between patterns of voluntary and involuntary migration. A few studies
                                                
1 There is often confusion between the concepts of human trafficking and smuggling. The UN anti-
smuggling Protocol (2000) states that in trafficking, elements of coercion and exploitation, and often
syndicates of organized crime are involved. A smuggled migrant, on the other hand, is an individual
who requests assistance to cross into another state where s/he has no right of residence and the
smuggler’s involvement goes no further than the crossing of the border (including the provision of
documentation). Salt and Hogarth, who have reviewed the various existing definitions, cite Belgium
as having adopted one of the largest definitions of trafficking in its ‘Alien Law’ of 1980 which does
not necessarily involve cross-border movement though it is often linked to issues of irregular
migration (2000: 20-23). ‘Trafficking in persons’ includes networks active in female prostitution (not
necessarily cross-border), networks smuggling asylum seekers into Belgium, and those who exploit
legal/illegal foreign employees. On the other hand, all smuggling networks do not have trafficking
activities. Salt and Hogarth (1998: 22) list another definition proposed by Meese et al. (1998)
according to which smuggling is a migration issue and has implications for the protection of the state,
while smugglers can work for profit as well as for humanitarian reasons. On the other hand,
trafficking in persons is a human rights issue, and has implications for the individual as a victim, and
traffickers work purely for financial gain. Either process is a violation of migrant legislation in at least
one of the countries involved (origin, transit or destination).2
avoid this pitfall by looking specifically at the smuggling of asylum seekers.
Unfortunately, they all concentrate on the last stage of irregular migration, either
looking at transit across Central or Eastern European countries, or at smuggling between
EU member states (Koser 1997; McDowell 1997; Morrison 1998; Koslowski 2000).
Again, very little is revealed of the transit and smuggling process of asylum seekers in
their regions of origin or at other stages along the route.
Moreover, recent trends of studies on international migration emphasize their
transnational character and point at the role played by social and economic networks in
prompting, facilitating, sustaining and directing the movement of migrants especially to
industrialized countries and their mobility between various regions of the world (Portes
1995; Van Hear 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999). Applying these paradigms to the
study of forced migrants, a few pioneering works now show that non-European refugees
and asylum seekers have found it increasingly difficult to gain admission to
industrialized countries unless they have been able to activate broad, transnational
networks composed of individuals of different migrant categories, in particular to pay
for the services of smugglers (Koser 1997; McDowell 1997; Muus 1997; Crisp and Van
Hear 1998; Koser and Lutz 1998; Morrison 1998; Doraï 2002). Several of these studies
emphasize the role of networks based on common affiliations such as ethnicity, kinship,
residential proximity or religion. But again, because these studies are located at one end
of the route in the country of destination, they cast little light on transit while it is an
essential process posing a link, and not a disruption, in migrants’ trajectories and in the
architecture and dynamics of the various networks that sustain their move.
In all cases, the first transit stage(s) of irregular asylum migration in countries of the
South has not been explored in depth, and a series of questions still need to be asked.
The first set of questions is related to the motivations of asylum migrants. What are the
initial intentions of forced migrants when they leave their country of origin? Why do a
number of them prefer to seek asylum in an industrialized country rather than in a state
closer to home? What about the treatment they receive in regional host countries, their
socio-economic conditions and legal status in first countries of reception and the impact
of these factors on migration strategies? In brief, does pointing at such pull factors as
lenient asylum policies or economic prosperity in industrialized countries explain
current trends of asylum migration and the complex motivations of migrants who
undertake long, costly and risky transcontinental journeys?
The second set of questions concerns the various means at the disposal of migrants to
undertake long distance and irregular moves. Is the functioning of the social networks
that support their migration similar to those of voluntary migrants? In particular, can
these networks operate between Western host countries and the country of origin,
knowing that these have particulars (being war-torn, politically unstable, under the grip
of authoritarian governments, etc.)? In this context, what about the role of the first host
country in providing a base for social networks to operate and for allowing smuggling?
Does the recruitment of migrants necessarily take place in the country of origin,
implying that forced migrants take their original decision to move to the West at the
beginning of their migration? In short, what does a study of transit in its first stage tell
us about the nature, the functioning and the inter-relations of the various networks that
sustain the movement of asylum migrants?3
This paper looks at the case of Iraqi forced migrants in the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. More particularly, it will explore how the country’s policy responses to this
influx, that started with the 1991 Gulf war, impact on the migrants’ decision to merely
transit Jordan, their first host country, rather than staying there long term. It a context of
extreme vulnerability, poverty, and religious-based discrimination, it will also look at
the support networks of migrants in Jordan, with a particular emphasis on religious
ones. Finally, it will document the smuggling process as it takes place from Jordan, a
country that concentrates the prerequisites for smuggling rings to operate, unlike Iraq.
Combining sociological and anthropological approaches, this paper will argue that the
structural context in the first regional host country plays a major part in shaping the
strategies of forced migrants, in determining their transit, and in allowing for the
development of smuggling and trafficking rings that intersect with migrants’ social –
here, religious – networks to allow for further emigration to Western industrialized
countries. In passing, it will also challenge a number of accepted views on the
distinctions between trafficking and smuggling and about the so-called pull of
industrialized countries.
1 Background
1.1 Iraqi forced migrants
In 1996, 4 million Iraqis were reported to live abroad (USCR 1996), of whom over
600,000 are currently recognized (convention or other) refugees.2 There were over
1,320,000 in 1992, the peak year. In 2001, Iraqis were the third main refugee caseload
in the world.
Following a first wave of forced migration during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the
majority of Iraqis currently living abroad as refugees or asylum seekers have fled their
country during the 1991 Gulf war or in the following decade. Most left Iraq in 1991-
1992, not so much as a direct consequence of the US-led bombing of the country but
rather because of two episodes of failed uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein.
In 1991, the Kurds in the Northern provinces and the Shiites in the central area revolted
and both uprisings where crushed. Repression has continued ever since, and so has out
migration of members of both groups at a slower but steady path. Later in the 1990s,
fighting between rival Kurdish factions in the northern autonomous provinces and the
drainage of the marshlands in the Shiite area of the Shatt el-Arab in the South have been
additional reasons for people to leave. Members of other social groups were also
prompted to leave their country as the embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in
1991 has contributed to deteriorating the domestic economic situation. Besides,
continuous violations of human rights still affect all kinds of opponents to the regime
(USCR 1991; LCHR 1992; UNHCR 1996; Amnesty International 1997). Often,
emigration is motivated by a mixture of economic and political factors, especially for
those social groups as the Shiites or the Kurds who are collectively denied access to
public resources. The outcome is that many people have no assurance either of physical
                                                
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in this paper are taken from UNHCR statistics (www.unhcr.ch).4
security or the ability to sustain their livelihoods, a fact that blurs the traditional
distinction between involuntary (or forced) migrants and voluntary (here, economic or
labour) migrants.
Whatever their final destination, Iraqis had, and still have to move first by road to a
neighbouring country since the embargo prevents them from travelling directly to a
more distant location by boat or aeroplane. Accessibility of the neighbouring countries
is conditioned by the opening of borders, the treatment received at the hands of the
authorities, other factors such as the presence of relatives, co-ethnics or co-religionists,
or the location of the country on route towards further emigration.
Over 250,000 Iraqis have requested asylum in a Western country during the last decade.
In most cases, they have reached their countries of final destination through irregular
channels after transiting first Turkey, Syria or Jordan.
1.2 Jordan’s policy responses
In the wake of the 1991 Gulf war, Jordan, bordering Iraq on the west, received an influx
of one million refugees from different nationalities that were fleeing Kuwait and Iraq.
Among those, about 360,000 were Jordanian involuntary ‘returnees’, that is, citizens of
the Hashemite Kingdom, most of them of Palestinian origin, that had settled in the Gulf
sometimes decades ago. Understandably, Jordan gave priority to the reception and
integration of those 300,000 who decided to remain in the country (Van Hear 1995).
Later in 1991, a wave of thousands of Shiite Iraqis came to Jordan after the uprising
against S. Hussein by members of their sect was forceably repressed. Since that date,
Iraqi migrants, voluntary or involuntary, have kept arriving to Jordan in smaller but
steady numbers, entering the kingdom through the one open border point, fleeing the
regime and the embargo. A majority has not remained in Jordan, but has used the
country as a gateway to other Arab or Western countries. In 1996, UNHCR Background
Paper on Iraqi Refugees and Asylum Seekers reported that, by some estimates, 1 to 2
million Iraqis had gone to Jordan since the Gulf war. According to the same source, the
number of Iraqis remaining in Jordan was undetermined because most were transiting.
The various sources, mainly reports from Human rights groups, that mention Iraqi
migrants in Jordan are not more precise (Amnesty International 1997; USCR 1991 to
2001; USDS 1991 to 2001). Official figures are non-existent and officials’ declarations
in the Jordanian media are inconsistent, varying from 50,000 to 180,000. NGO sources
may go up to 300,000. It is hard to make more than ‘guesstimates’ of the scale of Iraqi
immigration in Jordan, not only because the authorities prefer to be silent of the issue,
but also because of the nature of the transit migration. The group is unstable, people’s
stay is transitory and new individuals come as others go.
Jordan has adopted what can be deemed a ‘semi-protectionist’ policy towards Iraqi
forced migrants, that is, letting them in but depriving them of a status, of protection and
of means of livelihood (Chatelard 2002). The border with Iraq has always remained
open, and Iraqis can enter on a temporary visa and stay legally for up to 6 months. After
that period of time, they become illegal aliens and are under risk of being expelled back
to Iraq. Nevertheless, Jordan has always refrained from mass expulsion. On the other
hand, the country is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (henceforth 1951 Convention) but has allowed the United Nations5
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to operate on its soil since 1991. But the
UN agency’s recognition rate for Iraqi asylum seekers is much lower than that of
several industrialized countries and does not exceed 30 per cent, while recognized
refugees have to be resettled in a third country. Jordan has also adopted a set of
discriminatory social measures against Iraqi forced migrants, including those registered
as asylum seekers: they cannot work legally, schooling for children has been made
extremely difficult, almost no aid and relief is provided, and access to medical facilities
is more expensive than for Jordanian nationals. Finally, most Iraqi forced migrants are
Shiite, an Islamic sect with no indigenous members and no legal status in Sunni Jordan.
Shiites have been unable to obtain recognition from the authorities and experience
suspicion if not open discrimination.
The motives behind Jordan’s policy responses to the influx of Iraqi forced migrants
pertain to history, in particular to the Arab-Israeli conflict that has left Jordan to deal
with 1.6 million Palestinian refugees (out of a population of 5 million), and to such
current geopolitical realities as the UN-embargo that has turned Jordan into the external
border of Iraq, making it impossible to close the crossing point between the two
countries. Besides, Jordan is under dire economic strains as 30 per cent of its labour
force is unemployed. The authorities therefore argue of the economic and societal
incapacity to absorb large numbers of Iraqis. In many ways, Iraqi migration to Jordan is
seen as a security issue that should not be publicized by adopting pro-active measures
(Chatelard 2002).
Within the broader structural context of their official treatment, turning to the livelihood
strategies of Iraqi forced migrants in Jordan allows to understand two important
dynamics in the transit process. One is how discriminatory practices, deficient
administrative measures, and the limited role of UNHCR deter migrants from staying in
Jordan by making them an extremely vulnerable group. The other one is how, in last
recourse, they resort to social networks based on religious affiliations that first provide
material and moral support, and eventually are used as channels to undertake further
emigration in connection with smuggling rings.
1.3 Methodology
Iraqi migrants in/across Jordan are in many ways ‘invisible’ migrants if one is to judge
by how neglected they are in the grey literature produced by international organizations,
human rights groups, or Jordanian public bodies or civil society organizations (NGOs,
research centres, etc.). They are the object of no specific study and are usually only
mentioned in passing. Moreover, Jordanian officials are not available to discuss the
issue and the Jordanian press is of limited use. Consequently, I had to combine a
multiple methodology to gather sociological data and background information.
Between 1999 and 2001, in order to assess the socio-economic conditions of Iraqis in
Jordan and their livelihood strategies, I undertook in-depth fieldwork based mainly on
participant observation. I conducted about 40 informal interviews of Iraqi forced
migrants in Amman, most of the time in their homes, and kept regular, friendly relations
with a number of families or individuals. I regularly visited gathering places such as
coffee shops or the so-called Iraqi market in down town Amman. I also attended
religious meetings at churches and once accompanied a group of Shiites for the
celebration of the religious festival of Ashura. This was an occasion, among other6
things, to meet religious leaders. Subsequently, I was able to maintain relations over the
Internet with a number of individuals I had met in Jordan and who had successfully
migrated to Western Europe, North America or Australia. At that stage, they were
willing to provide me with details of the smuggling process with little risk involved.
During the summer of 2001, I visited some of them in the Netherlands and Denmark
where I was able to meet more Iraqis with whom I spoke about their migration and the
way they were supporting the emigration of others still in Jordan.
In May-June 2001, looking more specifically at those who claim asylum while in
Amman, UNHCR allowed me to conduct a survey of a sample of 121 asylum seekers
awaiting final decision. During face-to-face interviews conducted in Arabic, 70
questions were asked to assess their socio-economic profile, circumstances in Jordan,
network of family relations in Iraq and abroad, channels of information about Jordan
and the migration process, and future plans provided their claim was rejected. I
subsequently met some of them again outside the premises of UNHCR where they gave
me more details about their conditions and intentions. I estimate that the sample that has
served as a basis for this paper comprises roughly 200 individuals and many more
family members or friends of those interviewed, who provided more limited data.
Finally, at different stages over the last three years, I conducted several in-depth
interviews with the representative and staff at UNHCR in Amman, repeatedly met with
members of several foreign and local relief and human rights NGOs operating in Jordan,
and lately interviewed immigration officers in a number of Western embassies in
Amman.3
2 Profile, conditions, livelihood strategies
To assess the migrants’ socio-economic profile, legal status, and livelihood strategies in
Jordan, I made mainly, but not exclusively, use of the survey conducted with asylum
seekers at UNHCR, Amman. The aim of the survey was also to identify the pull factors
that had made them choose Jordan as a first host country, the reasons why they did not
want to stay, and their intentions of further emigration provided their claim for asylum
was rejected.4
                                                
3 Another paper by this author (Chatelard 2002) deals with the issue of Iraqi refugees in Jordan from a
policy perspective. For both papers, I am grateful to the representative and staff of UNHCR in
Amman who have provided me with invaluable information, insight and access to some of the Iraqi
asylum seekers. I also thank all the Iraqi respondents inside and outside UNHCR, the heads of various
foreign NGOs in Amman who have answered my questions, the immigration officers in some Western
Embassies that have shared information and comments with me, and the two anonymous reviewers
who commented on a draft of this paper. Fieldwork for this research, undertaken in 2000-2001, was
made possible by a series of grants from the Centre d’études et de recherches sur le Moyen-Orient
contemporain (CERMOC), based in Amman. Writing was undertaken as a Jean Monnet Fellow at the
Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence.
4 Questions about the push factors that motivated the respondents’ departure from Iraq were not asked
as they were not relevant to the study and as I was careful not to be confused with a member of
UNHCR interviewing them to assess their claim to refugee status. I made a point of clearly presenting
myself as an independent researcher. The sample was random and people were interviewed on a7
2.1 Socio-economic profile
Among respondents to the survey, men were 56.3 per cent and women 43.7 per cent,
64.6 per cent of all respondents were between 25 and 39 years old, while 23.7 per cent
were between 40 and 69 years old. The large female representation should not be taken
as an indication that Iraqi migrant women are generally almost as numerous as migrant
men. From other observations, it rather seems that women are over represented among
asylum seekers because they are more vulnerable than men and approach UNHCR more
frequently to provide for some kind of status and protection.
The typical profile of Iraqi forced migrants (who may not ask for asylum at UNHCR) is
a male between 25 and 45 who, if married, has left his family behind in Iraq until he
finds the proper opportunity to allow them come to Jordan. This occurs either if he gains
recognition of his refugee status at UNHCR, or if he manages to migrate to another
country and to send money for his family to move first to Amman, or if his stay in
Jordan endures and he has enough income to have his family join him. It can thus be
inferred that the proportion of Iraqi women in Jordan has increased since the second half
of the 1990s as more Iraqi men have made it to the West or as many have been stranded
in Jordan for several years.
A large majority of the respondents were Shiites (66.8 per cent); followed by Christians
(13.1 per cent), Sunnis, (11.7 per cent), and Sabeans (8.4 per cent).5 If Shiites represent
roughly 55 per cent of the population of Iraq, Sunnis account for another 35 per cent,
the rest being mainly Assyro-Chaldean Christians while the Sabeans are less than 0.5
per cent. Among the respondents, the over-representation of Christians, Sabeans and
Shiites, and the under-representation of Sunnis, are clear signs that religious minorities
are leaving Iraq at a higher rate than the Sunni sociological majority that does not suffer
from group persecution or discrimination.6
Of the respondents 90.4 per cent defined themselves as ethnically Arabs. The rest
answered that they were Assyrian, Kurd in two occasions, and Turkmen on one
occasion. As regards the Kurds, who represent 15 per cent of all Iraqi nationals, the fact
that only few of them come to Jordan is confirmed by further discussion and
observation outside the strict limits of the survey. This is due to geographical and socio-
political factors: the proximity of Turkey or Iran to the north and north-east of Iraq
where most of the Kurds reside and the fact that, as a cross-border ethnic group, they
prefer to travel to another Kurdish area.
Typically, Iraqi forced migrants who have approached UNHCR to seek asylum are
individuals with a secondary or university education (> 90 per cent), who have held
                                                                                                                                              
voluntary basis as they were coming to UNHCR to renew documents and not on the day when they
were scheduled for an interview with UNHCR staff.
5 The Sabeans, or Mandaeans, are a sect dating back to the first centuries of Christianity and are
followers of John the Baptist. As Jews and Christians, they are recognized by Moslem tradition as
‘Peoples of the Book’. The community is concentrated in Iraq and has no more than 20,000 members.
6 Sunnis are more numerous amongst those Iraqis who do not seek asylum in Jordan and move back and
forth between the two countries, such as suitcase traders, taxi drivers, illegal workers in agriculture or
construction, and wealthy businessmen that have managed to secure a permanent residence permit in
Jordan.8
positions as civil servants (this includes physicians and engineers), teachers, traders or
shopkeepers in Iraq (73.5 per cent). Women have an equally high rate of secondary and
university education and roughly two-thirds were once employed in Iraq. Except for
those Shiites who come from the marshlands in the South (7.5 per cent of total), or for
village Assyrians from the North (4 per cent of total), they have an urban background.
Most migrants considered themselves as having once been reasonably well-off in Iraq
but had experienced a dramatic drop of income following the devaluation of the Iraqi
Dinar or because they were fired from their employment in the public sector. They
usually came to Jordan with their savings, either after selling their belongings or
properties in Iraq or with money lent by relatives.
This leads to two remarks. First, the lower middle class or the severely impoverished
Iraqis do not have the financial means to undertake long-term emigration. If they come
to Jordan, they belong to that category of people who go back and forth and work
mainly as street vendors in Amman. Second, the amount of money forced migrants take
with them, and the large proportion who have sold all their properties, are signals that
they are not planning to go back to Iraq in the near future or even at all. This was the
case with 67.8 per cent of the Christians and Sabeans, and one-third of the Shiite
respondents who said that they had sold everything they had.
2.2 Socio-economic situation in Jordan
As regards their socio-economic situation in Jordan, only 7.2 per cent of the male
respondents said they did not work at all. But of those working, only 2.3 per cent had a
work permit, and 71.6 per cent said that they worked on and off as street vendors,
cleaners, painters and other petty jobs. The others, roughly 20 per cent, who had a
steady job were cleaners, gardeners, or office boys. Of the women 74.5 per cent were
totally unemployed, and those working were also domestic workers or were working as
seamstresses at home. Only two had an illegal but steady clerical job.
The average monthly income respondents declared to earn was 40 Jordanian Dinars
(JD)7 for a single person and 70 JD for a household, unsteady in 84.5 per cent of the
cases. Those who had the highest income were benefiting from the financial support of
relatives abroad, and/or had arrived recently in Jordan and were still living on their
savings. In Jordan, the poverty line is estimated below 100 JD a month for a household
and all people interviewed, including those outside the survey sample, felt that they
were experiencing a dire professional and social downfall and had been placed in a
much lower social status than the one they belonged to in Iraq. As employment is
scarce, unsteady and not well paid, and as the cost of living in Jordan is up to 10 times
higher than in Iraq, migrants who come with savings spend them in a few months. After
a period of being relatively well off, most survive at the margin of the Jordanian society,
engaging in menial jobs in the informal sector, and facing an extremely precarious
economic situation.
Their situation is further aggravated by their housing conditions. Iraqi migrants
concentrate in the cities where they can live in a familiar environment and pass rather
unnoticed, and where they hope to maximize their social and economic opportunities.
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While 87.4 per cent of the respondents resided in Amman, the others lived in urban
areas within a radius of 40 km from the capital. Typically, they lived in unsanitary and
overcrowded housings in the poverty belt of Amman, and in informal/squatter areas
with a high Palestinian refugee population. These neighbourhoods can be equated to
refugee camps but without the legal status and the facilities (sewage system, electricity
and water, health and educational systems).
Only three families among the 54.2 per cent who had school-age children were sending
them to school, and they were all Christians benefiting from aid from a Catholic relief
society. The other ones answered that they thought schools were not open to Iraqi
children, or that they had tried but been told to produce documents they had not taken
with them from Iraq.
Finally, 41.3 per cent declared that they currently had, or had had, health problems
while in Jordan but only 9.8 per cent had been medically consulted. In 67.3 per cent of
the cases, at least one of the respondents’ children currently had medical problems too,
and 40.1 per cent had been brought to a consultation. All those interviewed said that
they gave priority to their children’s health over their own. Of those who had reasons to
consult but had not been to a medical facility, 93.7 per cent said that it was too
expensive.
2.3 Reasons for choosing Jordan
Open borders and expected work opportunities are the two main reasons respondents
gave when asked why they had selected Jordan and not another neighbouring country
such as Turkey, Syria or Iran. The possibility to approach UNHCR came only in fourth
position after accessibility of third countries, either in the Arab world or in the West.
Other frequent answers (there were multiple possibilities) included the fact that Jordan
was an Arab, and not foreign country, the presence of relatives that had already moved
there, or the fact that it was the less risky choice. This calls for a number of remarks.
Firstly, most people do not have the initial intention of crossing borders illegally, an
important point to consider for future developments. Among the Shiites interviewed, a
majority had close or distant relatives that were refugees in Iran, a country party to the
1951 Convention. Nevertheless, they took into account the fact that the Iraq-Iran border
was closed to migrants and did not want to take the risk of being arrested or shot. The
same goes with the Assyro-Chaldeans who could have attempted to cross irregularly
into Syria where a number of their co-religionists and family members have been
granted asylum under UNHCR mandate at the beginning of the 1990s.
Secondly, as other questions asked show, an overwhelming majority of the migrants had
a distorted vision of the economic situation in Jordan before they undertook to move
there. Similarly, they had no accurate knowledge of the legal and socio-economic
conditions of Iraqi migrants. Compared to Iraq in the 1990s, Jordan looked to them like
a wealthy country with a thriving work market. Besides, they expected the Jordanian
authorities to demonstrate a degree of Arab solidarity with them and give them a legal
status and a work permit.
This poses questions as to how information circulates between Jordan and Iraq. Those
who do go back and forth, like taxi or bus drivers, ‘suitcase traders’, street vendors or10
mobile labourers, do see Jordan as a place for economic gain. On the other hand, Iraqi
forced migrants who are in Jordan and cannot or do not want to go back to Iraq have
very limited means of passing on detailed information to relatives left behind. There is
no postal service between the two countries and Iraq forbids Internet access. Telephone
lines are frequently tapped and conversations limited to a minimum. Letters sent with
taxi drivers cannot tell much either for fear the Iraqi authorities intercept them, and oral
messages though these same intermediaries are necessarily brief. As a result, and
despite the proximity of the two countries, Iraqis come to Jordan with expectations that
are not met. These possibly derive from the fact that Jordan did once offer jobs to a
good number of highly skilled Iraqis and that it is still the dominant image in Iraq
today.8
Thirdly, only one-third of the respondents had come to Jordan with the idea of transit in
mind. These were mainly the ones who already had family members abroad and/or who
had no family members in Iraq anymore. They had either come to seek family
reunification through UNHCR, or had initially expected to obtain an immigration visa
easily in a foreign embassy based on their being Iraqis who were fleeing the regime of
S. Hussein. The fact is that, between 1991 and 1994, Western consulates delivered a
number of visas on humanitarian grounds preferably to those who were skilled and
already had relatives in the destination country. In this way, Iraqi Christians who had a
long record of migration to Australia, Canada, the United States or Brazil left in large
numbers. Moreover, until 1998, doctors, engineers or teachers could hope to negotiate a
work contract in Yemen or Libya though these countries’ embassies in Amman. But all
these possibilities have now sharply declined, if not totally disappeared.
Apart from those who were planning to transit Jordan rapidly, two-thirds of the
respondents came to Jordan in view of staying long-term, at least until the political
situation at home improved so that they could go back. This fact is confirmed by
numerous other persons interviewed in other settings, who said that they would rather
stay close to Iraq where they could still communicate with relatives, albeit in a limited
fashion, or easily reunite with them if the relatives had to leave. It is only as an ultimate
choice that they are/were convinced to undertake further migration out of Jordan.
Finally, despite the fact that all the individuals in the sample survey were registered
with UNHCR as asylum seekers, only 17 per cent of them mentioned choosing Jordan
because of the possibility of asking for asylum, and among those only a few had heard
of UNHCR’s office in Amman before they left Iraq. The overwhelming majority learnt
about the organization from other Iraqis in Jordan. While, as an average, respondents
had been in Jordan for 22 months (with a minimum of 4 months and a maximum of 51
months), most had waited for about a year before approaching UNHCR, an issue on
which I shall return to later.
                                                
8 The statements made in an IOM paper about the mechanisms of distorted information between
migrants and those left at home do not seem to be applicable in the case under study: ‘(…) it is known
that information received from family or friends is considered to be the most trustworthy. Ironically,
however, information from this source has a tendency to be distorted – often including exaggerations
or falsehoods about the informant’s success (…). This often leads to a self-perpetuating network of
informants who are reluctant to admit that they have not been successful in their migration attempts
(…).’ (IOM 1994: 18). In the case of Iraq, it is rather the nature of the communication system(s) that
accounts for the distortion.11
2.4 Legal documentation
Most forced migrants enter Jordan on a legal basis with a valid Iraqi passport. A
minority is smuggled across the border or enters with a fraudulent passport because of
not having been able to secure an intelligence-approved travel document in Iraq. As
stated above, most Iraqi forced migrants (that is, those who do not want/cannot return to
Iraq), fall into illegality after 6 months of residence with risks of being expelled by the
authorities. This is only one aspect of the problem of legal documentation Iraqis
experience while in Jordan.
Illegal aliens cannot access the official work market, nor most state-subsidized services
such as health and education. While employers usually underpay their Iraqi labourers,9
unscrupulous ones do not even pay them at all and Iraqis have no legal recourse. On the
other hand, as landlords have to register their foreign tenants with the police, proper
housing is a problem. This is why most Iraqis are confined to informal areas.
Nevertheless, their housing rents are on average 1.5 higher than those of their
Jordanian/Palestinian neighbours and there are no renting contracts, tenants being able
to expel them at any time.
Finally, several of them cannot obtain documents from their embassy for fear of the
Iraqi intelligence. When their passports expire, they cannot renew them, or cannot get
birth, marriage or death certificates. Some use middlemen to undertake these
administrative steps, but these services have a cost that not all Iraqis can afford. As even
Sunni religious courts do not want to register the marriages of the Shiites, their new-
borns or even deliver a death certificate in a country where religious communities are in
charge of personal and family status, many migrants are deprived of any legal existence
after a few months in Jordan.
But maybe the worst aspect of the documentation problem concerns the fine for
overstaying that most Iraqis are unable to pay. It amounts to 1.5 JD per day of
overstaying and keeps secluded inside Jordan even those who at one point could decide
to go back to Iraq. There is a possibility of being exempted from the penalty on exit, but
in this case individuals are not allowed in Jordan anymore, that is, they are trapped
inside Iraq for five years or have to find another exit route, two very bleak prospects for
most of those who have left their country with no desire of return under the current
circumstances.
2.5 UNHCR and asylum
In view of the difficult situation they face in Jordan, Iraqi forced migrants have limited
strategic choices available to them in order to improve their legal status. The most
obvious one is to register as an asylum seeker with UNHCR, even if some know that
their claim in unfounded. In the last years, UNHCR’s recognition rate of Iraqi asylum
seekers in Jordan was 20 per cent on average. Including those who have no hope of ever
becoming ‘legal’ refugees, the registration card provided by UNHCR, and the long
delay for treatment of the cases (up to 2 years in case of appeal), allow for taking a legal
                                                
9 A Sri Lankan house-maid gets 1.5 JD an hour, an Iraqi woman performing the same job gets only
1 JD. Likewise, hour rates are lower for Iraqi male labourers than for Egyptians.12
foothold in Jordan, avoiding possible expulsion, and planning for the future. As a side
effect, and since UNHCR’s staff are aware of this tactic, the number of non-bona fide
asylum seekers devaluates the asylum claim of those genuinely in need of protection as
they are all suspected to be bogus.10
In fact, a surprisingly small proportion of Iraqi forced migrants chose UNHCR as an
option. Between 1991 and 2000, roughly 30,000 only had sought asylum through the
UN agency.11 There are a number of reasons that might account for this low figure.
Some pertain to a bad knowledge of the functioning of UNHCR’s office. As most of the
Iraqis are illegal aliens, keep a very low profile, and go into hiding, they are afraid to
come out because they believe that they will be handed over to the Jordanian police for
having overstayed. In fact, their view is that UNHCR shares information on cases with
the Jordanian authorities. A more serious concern is that Iraqi agents have infiltrated
UNHCR, a fear that deters many to approach the organization. Another type of reason
that might explain why relatively few Iraqis present themselves to the organization is
their fear of seeing their claim rejected and of being subsequently deported back to Iraq
where, until recently, they incurred the death penalty for having claimed asylum abroad.
Finally, a number of those who seem to have genuine cases do not want to approach
UNHCR in Jordan, a country that offers temporary shelter but not asylum. They want to
choose were they will settle, a difficult thing to do with the resettlement process where
host states establish quotas in response to domestic interests and where little scope is
left for refugees to choose their final destination. In particular, several Shiite clerics I
met had suffered serious persecution at the hands of the intelligence in Iraq, but did not
want to register with UNHCR because their aim was specifically to reach London, a
major centre of Shiite learning where they had colleagues. They said they intended to
seek asylum directly in the UK once they had managed to get there through irregular
channels.
2.6 Intentions of further emigration
As most do not achieve either economic or physical security and know that there is little
prospect for improvement of their situation, and as their savings diminish rapidly, Iraqi
migrants for whom returning to Iraq is not an option start thinking of leaving Jordan for
a better place. Of the respondents 98.2 per cent stated that they wanted to leave Jordan
as soon as possible, and gave as main reasons their bad economic situation, living
conditions, and insecure status. Before leaving Iraq, only a minority initially viewed
Jordan as a transit stage and had some accurate information about the means at their
disposal to move on, and most respondents reckoned that they did not have realistic
                                                
10 To a certain extent, one wonders if several well founded cases have not been rejected because of the
prevailing atmosphere of suspicion against asylum seekers at UNHCR. In fact, the recognition rate of
Iraqis in Lebanon, who do not seem to have a profile that differs markedly from those in Jordan, is
much higher: in 1998, while UNHCR Jordan recognized 13 per cent of the cases, UNHCR Lebanon
recognized 50 per cent. But Iraqis are much less numerous in Lebanon that they access by crossing
first into Jordan and/or Syria.
11 It is interesting to see where Jordan stands in the geography of Iraqi asylum. In 1998, it was the
second country which had received the largest number of applications by Iraqis (7,872), preceded by
the Netherlands (8,300), and followed by Germany (7,435) while none of these two countries had a
comparable population of Iraqis on their national territories.13
ideas about visa regulations or employment opportunities in Western countries before
reaching Jordan. Once they take the decision to leave Jordan, they are not naive
anymore as they have had time to be informed by other migrants who have been there
for a longer period.
One of the important sets of information circulating among migrants, and making up for
a good part of their discussions, is the possibility of seeking asylum in Western
countries. It is accurately said that in some European countries or in Australia the
recognition rate of Iraqi asylum seekers is more than twice higher than that of UNHCR
in Amman. Besides, in case of rejection of their claims, Iraqis also know that they can
stay in Western states as illegal aliens and will not be deported back into Iraq. They
hope to find a job with the help of fellow nationals. On the other hand, they also learn
that Syria or Lebanon will not offer them substantially better opportunities than Jordan.
As a whole, work and security, which they cannot find in Jordan or elsewhere in the
Middle East, are available in Europe, in North America or in Australia.
Among the respondents to the survey, only 9.3 per cent had no family member, relative
or close friend abroad. Of the remaining 90.7 per cent, two-thirds had family members,
relatives or close friends in a Western country, of which 89.6 per cent were either
asylum seekers or refugees. While those who had left people behind in Iraq had a low
and irregular level of communication with them, all those who knew Iraqis settled in the
West were maintaining a high level of communication either over the telephone, by
post, or though the Internet. Together with details about emigration from Jordan gained
from other Iraqi migrants in the country, those who intended to leave Jordan generally
had an amazing knowledge of asylum procedures in the countries where they had
connections. On the other hand, only 5.2 per cent of the respondents (exclusively
Sabeans and Christians) said they had left nobody behind, even distant relatives. These
were in fact the last groups of whole enlarged families to leave with no prospect of ever
returning. But for the 94.5 per cent others, relatives and family members constitute a
pool of potential migrants that are very likely to eventually follow those who leave
Jordan on their way to the West.
3 Networking for survival
3.1 Aid and relief from religious institutions and networks
There is no aid and relief provided by Jordanian public or private institutions or by
foreign NGOs who are prevented by the authorities to set up projects aimed at Iraqis.
On the other hand, Jordan has a thriving, well integrated local Christian community and
Church charities are the only ones allowed to provide aid to Iraqis, mostly in kind. The
official possibilities offered by the Jordanian authorities to the Christian community so
that it takes care of Iraqi co-religionists stem from the complementary relationship that
has historically developed between the Hashemite state and the various Christian
Church organizations (Chatelard 1997). In this context, the religious affiliation of
migrants is an important factor to take into account to understand both their livelihood
strategies in Jordan and their migration process out of Jordan. Just as religious
affiliation is the main means through which the Jordanian society discriminates against14
categories of Iraqi migrants, so does religious affiliation become one of the main ways
forced migrants use to skirt the very same discrimination.
Asked if they had approached institutions for help and which ones (except UNHCR),
respondents to the survey answered yes in only 15.4 per cent of the cases. Catholic and
Protestant charities, parish churches or the Italian Hospital (run by a Catholic religious
community) were the only institutions they listed. These facilities are officially open on
a non-denominational basis, yet all but four of their users were Christians or Sabeans.
Generally, those Moslem respondents who knew of their existence but had not
approached them justified their attitude by saying that these were reserved for
Christians.
In practice, it is true that Christian charities offer some of theirs services more willingly
to Christian than to Moslem Iraqis. Caritas, for example, operates in Iraq from Jordan
and facilitates the move of Iraqi Christians out of Iraq. Once in Jordan, it provides them
with a number of social services such as medical care and, on some occasions,
schooling for children in Catholic schools. Besides, the organization runs an income-
generating project for Iraqi women in a mainly Christian populated town in the vicinity
of Amman. Church officials may also act as middlemen for the granting of visas to
Western countries or intercede in favour of detained illegal aliens.
For their part, Iraqi Shiites do not have any previous experience of accessing Christian
hospitals or other social or educational facilities, a fact not uncommon among Jordanian
Sunni Moslems. Moreover, the granting of aid to Iraqi migrants in Jordan seems to be
used as an avenue by American missionary organizations, and Iraqi Shiites do not
differentiate between non-missionary and missionary Christian activities. They hold all
their relief services in deep suspicion.12 Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that,
apart from Christians and Sabeans, most other Iraqi migrants do not turn to existing,
local Christian charities.
The major Christian denominations present in Jordan have an official status that allows
them to run social and medical facilities. On the other hand, Shiite Islam has no
indigenous followers in Jordan, no official status and therefore no established social
institutions or facilities and no legal possibility to register any. Sunni mosques and
charities, zakat committees or medical facilities (like the Islamic Hospital and various
religious-based NGOs) may provide Sunni Iraqis with some relief. But these structures
do not have their networks of schools and cannot help migrants gain access to Western
consulates or protect them from expulsion. Moreover, they are not willing to aid the
Shiites who, in turn, expect to be ill received on the basis of their religious affiliation,
which they cannot hide as they have a very distinctive way of praying. Because of all
these factors, Shiite Iraqis, who are a majority of the forced migrants, are those who
receive less relief, are the most unlikely to find backing among Jordanians or to be
protected by civil society organizations, and are therefore the most vulnerable group.
                                                
12 In all likelihood, this is not without reasons. The website of Servlife International, based in Houston,
calls for a US$30 donation to provide ‘an emergency relief packet with a Bible to Iraqi refugees in
Jordan’. Another one, CompassionRadio.com, asks for US$2 to ‘help support a ministry providing
Christian Day-Care (sic) for the [Iraqi] refugee children [in Jordan], where they will be taught the
truth about Jesus and His love’. A couple of Shiite websites based in the UK denounce these threats
arguing that they aim at Moslem children.15
Despite the fact that the Jordanian authorities are suspicious of any informal Shiite
religious gathering, semi-clandestine prayer rooms have been opened in the apartments
of young mollahs (clerics) who have left Nadjaf or Karbala, the major centres of Shiite
learning in Iraq. These majlis, or meeting places, are reserved for men who gather on
Fridays and during religious festivals (Ashura, Ramadan). Majlis have a religious role
but also perform a major social function: migrants find moral support, newcomers bring
news from relatives and the political situation at home, participants exchange
information about available jobs and housings in Jordan, etc. Apart from the Iraqi
market and a few coffee-shops in Amman, majlis are the only places of gathering that
are tolerated by the Jordanian authorities which keep an eye on them and close them at
times. Permanent links are kept with the Shiite centres in UK, Iran and Iraq through a
circulation of individuals, information and money used for relief but also, as I will show
later, for undertaking migration to the West.13
Much more than Iraqi Christians, the Shiite community therefore remains at the margin
of Jordanian society. Its members cannot access economic security in Jordan and have
to cope with the negative image Jordanians have of them as both Iraqis and Shiites.
More than the Sunnis, who in many cases expect to repatriate sooner or later or even go
back and forth on a regular basis and trade between the two countries, the Shiites make
no long-term investment in Jordan. Moreover, the community is permanently being
reshaped: majlis can be closed by the police, mollahs can migrate to the West either as
refugees resettled by UNHCR or through irregular channels, new mollahs may arrive
from Iraq, and laymen also leave to the West while new ones come.
Iraqi migrants’ needs are merely socio-economic and their concerns revolve around
personal security and work opportunities. Since the absence of a legal or religious status
does not allow them to have a stable foothold or officially recognized representatives,
they are in no position to approach the Jordanian authorities and negotiate an
improvement of their situation. Therefore, they have no public claim for recognition or
integration, and no demands for the granting of collective rights. Their desire to leave
Jordan keeps growing as their stay extends, and as years pass they want to reunite with
family members who have successfully completed their migration to a safer haven.
Whatever their denominational affiliation, Iraqi forced migrants establish only
temporary enclaves on the edge of the Jordanian society that allows them to survive
only in its margins.
3.2 The pull of social networks
Once they have taken the decision to emigrate from Jordan, Iraqis face a new set of
difficulties as the immigration policies of Western countries in the last decade have
resulted in a limitation of the legal possibilities of access and admission. Yet, this reality
does not seem to deter Iraqis who, with the help of smugglers and the support of social
networks, find legal or illegal ways of skirting visa restrictions and increased border
control. There are clear patterns in the direction of Iraqi emigration from Jordan in
                                                
13 An interesting aspect of these majlis is that they are attended by men who were not necessarily
religious when in Iraq. Many were even close to the Communist Party. Once in Jordan, in the absence
of any other network of support, they are dragged into the majlis where they need first to gain
religious respectability before applying for financial support.16
particular, and from the Middle East in general. Their final destinations in Western
Europe are mainly Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK.
Much further away, Australia has also become a favourite choice together with Canada.
One may therefore ask two main questions. One is what are the pull factors that attract
Iraqis to certain Western countries and not to others. The other one is how they reach
these destinations from Jordan taking into account the considerable administrative and
practical difficulties they encounter, and the amount of money such a journey implies.
Concentrating on the migrants’ efforts while they are still in Jordan, but already dragged
into transnational dynamics, I will attempt to give an analytical view of the choices that
are available to them and of the difficulties they face to take the first step of their
journey, that is, exiting Jordan.
The main reason for choosing a country of final destination in the West is first and
foremost the presence of family members, friends or co-religionists. These often appear
in conjunction as Iraqis have now been migrating for a decade in large numbers and
formal communities or informal groupings of Iraqis have had time to develop,
especially in the main reception countries. From the interviews I conducted both in
Jordan and in Western Europe, and from other scattered sources, it well seems that both
the ethnic and religious affiliation of Iraqi migrants determine the direction of their
migration. Whereas, among Western states, Germany hosts the largest Iraqi community
(over 50,000), relatively few of those I interviewed (15.7 per cent of the respondents to
the survey) mentioned that they had relatives there. In fact, it is mainly the Kurds who
move to Germany, as a number of studies on migrant communities in Europe have
shown. The Shiites listed first the UK, then Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. As
far as could be assessed from the scarce, non-academic literature available on Shiite
communities in Western Europe, and from looking at religious sites on the Internet, all
these countries have registered Shiite associations and mosques. Iraqi Christians, on the
other hand, cited most frequently Australia, Canada, the United States or the UK, where
they have a much longer tradition of emigration that predates the current trend. In all
these countries, there exist Assyrian and/or Chaldean associations and churches
established before the 1990s (for the UK, and the only study devoted to the non-Kurdish
Iraqi diaspora, see Al-Rasheed 1998). There is no need to expatiate on the pull factor
constituted by the presence of personal or other social networks, a dynamic that has
been extensively explored in various studies on international migration (in particular,
see Portes 1995; Van Hear 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Faist 2000).
‘People die like flies nowadays’. This is how the immigration officer in the embassy of
a Nordic country in Amman jokingly put it to explain how Iraqis were abusing
humanitarian visas his country grants to foreigners who want to attend the funeral of a
relative there. Iraqis, of course almost never return and more and more come to the
embassy and produce genuine death certificates established by the relevant authorities.
They also have the proper documentation to prove their family connection with the
deceased. Documents are not necessarily fake as the number of Iraqis in Nordic
countries today is large enough to explain that more and more pass away there. But it
illustrates that many Iraqis are ready to exploit every legal means to migrate and every
loophole in the legislation they are aware of, and that social networks are essential
means in this regard. These loopholes are numerous and it is not my aim here to list all
those that Iraqis take advantage of. They are very much the ‘holes in the wall’ Bigo
(1996) and other analysts of European security policies point at as being left voluntarily
by the authorities for a variety of economic reasons linked to the increased need of
cheap labour.17
But the types of legal holes left put some Iraqis at more advantage than others. Australia
and Canada have sponsorship schemes for refugees or immigrants. In the case of the
latter country, relatives settled in Canada or groups of a maximum five legal entities can
submit a sponsorship to the authorities where they have to prove that they can meet the
financial needs of the sponsored for the ten years to come. Cases rejected by UNHCR
can also reach the Canadian Immigration Board by sponsored files. These cases are
dealt with at the embassy in Amman without consulting UNHCR. Comparable schemes
are also available for emigration to Australia. Those benefit Iraqi Christians more than
their Moslem co-nationals, for the simple reason that Churches have both the financial
and legal credentials to act as sponsors, that they are alerted by Church communities in
Jordan, or by the Iraqi Christian community in exile whose size is larger than that of the
Moslems, and who have had time to organize since their history of emigration to both
countries is longer. Once again, it is the Shiites who are at a disadvantage, and also
those who are left with no other option than to resort to smugglers in order to leave
Jordan.
3.3 The smuggling process and social networks
The techniques and organizations Iraqi migrants resort to in order to reach the West
despite the various visa requirements and police constraints are primarily determined by
the very same constraints. As Koslowski expresses it:
Just as states cooperate to control unwanted migration (…), unwanted
migrants can cooperate as well to form social networks that facilitate
international migration. Just as states deputize private sector actors, such
as airlines, to enforce tougher migration controls and thereby change ‘the
gatekeeper’ that confront the prospective migrant, migrants are
employing non-state actors, smugglers, to foil restrictions imposed by
states, and thereby transform the ‘gatecrashers’ from hapless peasants
who may have never travelled abroad to teams of border crossers led by
professionals, often using the latest technologies money can buy.
(Koslowski 2000: 205)
Albeit Iraqi forced migrants are in no way ‘hapless peasants’, paying for the services of
smugglers or forgers is at the core of their migration strategies. But in Jordan, as in
other transit countries in the Middle East, it is impossible to obtain official data on the
volume of migrants smuggled out of the country. One exception is Turkey that has
allowed IOM to conduct a survey on transit migration on its territory showing that the
overwhelming majority were Iraqi Kurds and that very few non-Kurdish Iraqis were
transiting that country (IOM 1995). On the other hand, the rare studies devoted to
refugees in Iran show that the Iraqi Arabs among them have received the best treatment
of all refugees and are therefore less likely to undertake further emigration to the West
(Rajaee 2000; Le Roy 2001; various UNHCR documents). Knowing that few
opportunities exist for legal migration, all these elements allow for assessing that Jordan
is the main smuggling route for Iraqi Arabs out of the Middle East.
Most of the Iraqi migrants I have talked to who had resorted to smuggling rings stated
that they would have rather moved onward legally than breaking immigration laws and18
taking risks.14 They said that they only resorted to irregular migration in the absence of
legal avenues, and that they could not grasp the motive behind the coupling of stringent
border controls with liberal asylum laws. The fact that asylum seekers cannot use legal
means to be admitted in countries that offer them proper protection questions the very
notion of ‘smuggling’ and the very concept of ‘illegal’ migration. Iraqi migrants
themselves, if they do use the Arabic word for ‘smuggling’ (tahrib), sometimes simply
refer to smugglers as ‘middlemen’, if not as ‘saviours’. Morrison, in a report on
trafficking and asylum seekers in the UK, argues that: ‘There is no straight divide
between humanitarian and commercial trafficking (…). In some cases the ‘agent’ (…) is
both a criminal and a saver of lives’ (Morrison 1998: 1). For social scientists, smuggling
implies a re-conceptualization of international migration, which is traditionally regarded
as a relationship between migrants and a host government aiming at controlling access
to its territory. Moreover, smuggling blurs the distinction between legal and illegal
migrants as smugglers may deliberately help facilitate legal forms of migration at one
stage or another of the migration process. For example, in international refugee law it is
not considered criminal for asylum seekers to enter a country by illegal means.
Smugglers, on the other hand, manage to obtain proper visas on proper passports but
with fake work certificates and invitation letters. At different stages, migrants thus drift
in and out of legal status.
As for Iraqis, their recruitment does not take place in Iraq but in Jordan. The country is
a nodal location because it concentrates the various prerequisites for smuggling to
develop and function that are not available in Iraq: foreign embassies (Western and non-
Western), Jordanian nationals or nationals of other countries whose passports can be
bought or stolen, the necessary technology to forge documents, Internet and untapped
telephone lines, a liberal banking system which allows international transfer of money,
an international airport with numerous flights in all directions, or, alternatively, open
borders to Syria and then Turkey. Therefore, in Jordan, Iraqi prospective migrants to the
West can get real or forged travel documents, they can access transportation to leave the
country, obtain information on where best to leave to by calling their relatives who are
already in the West or by getting information on asylum procedures via the Internet.
Finally those who pay for their smuggling can have money transferred to them in
Jordan. All these are things that cannot be done from Iraq with which very few Western
countries maintain diplomatic ties, under embargo and with no airport facilities, with
state-controlled banks and a heavy security apparatus.
It seems that, as has been documented in the case of Poland (Salt and Hogarth 2000:
48), it is the demand for out migration from Jordan that has created business
opportunities exploited by Jordanian individuals or organizations that have used existing
structures or created new ones. From a number of cases I looked at, it appears that
several of the smuggling/trafficking organizations are the heirs of Jordanian middlemen
                                                
14 For obvious methodological reasons, it is difficult to assess very clearly how the smuggling process
works, who are the smugglers and/or traffickers, and how they are organized within Jordan and at the
transnational level. Smuggled/trafficked individuals are often not aware of the overall functioning of
the organization and can only contribute partial knowledge. Besides, they are reluctant to give details
before undertaking their journey. It is therefore easier to collect information at the other end of the
route when the migrants feel they have escaped the grip of the smugglers/traffickers or of the border
police and can reveal information without risk. The best was to contact migrants in Jordan and wait
until they had completed their migration process to Western Europe or Australia to interview them
face to face or over the Internet.19
already performing cross-border activities, though usually in the direction of South East
Asia. Some of the agencies that bring foreign domestic workers to Jordan and have a
wide knowledge of administrative requirements and travel documentation perform
migrant smuggling as a supplementary area of business without specializing in it. Some
bogus travel agencies have been set up in the popular down town area of Amman, where
they openly advertise for travel visas or advice on how to emigrate to the West on their
shop windows. Migrants are not deceived and know that these firms perform illegal
activities even though they have a legal front. Therefore, it is not so much the smugglers
that need to approach the migrants, as the migrants who have learnt from others where
to go and call on the smugglers, whose main function is to provide proper
documentation or help to cross over to Syria to connect to the Turkish route. Trust is a
very important element of the trade that involves paying a good part of the services in
advance. As fees for transportation or documents are substantial and appear to be rising,
migrants prefer to rely on those networks that have successfully permitted their relatives
of friends to reach the West and can be seen as honest.
Route patterns from Jordan to Europe are closely determined by Jordan’s geographical
situation and by the cost-benefit of the enterprise. A direct route by sea from Aqaba and
the Suez canal is impossible: Jordan does not have enough coastline to secretly board
migrants and ships are controlled in Suez. The main known route from the Middle East
into Europe goes through Turkey, which acts as a hub where migrants from mainly Iraqi
Kurdistan, Iran and Afghanistan meet, and then continue either by sea to Italy or by land
to Greece and the Balkans. Because from Jordan it involves crossing several borders
illegally or obtaining an equivalent number of fake documents and visas, and paying at
each stage, the cost is high, and estimates vary between US$4,000 and US$6,000 with
risks at each and every step and months to reach the final destination. A new route is
now developing through Lebanon or Syria where Iraqis board ships but all these routes
are considered extremely risky.
From Jordan to Western Europe, the most direct and safest route is by aeroplane. This
implies a different set of conditions, a higher cost but more security: besides buying a
plane ticket and often paying fees for overstay, one needs proper travel documents, that
is, a valid passport and a visa or a falsified foreign passport. They can be obtained in
Amman where a trade of passports and forgery has developed. Stolen passports, with
substitution of photographs, can replace a genuine Iraqi passport, especially if it comes
from a third Arab country or from a Southern European state like Greece or Portugal for
reasons of verisimilitude. Visas may be fraudulent, but more frequently they are genuine
and obtained after providing fake employment certificates in Jordan, letters of invitation
in Europe by ghosts companies, and genuine bank statements,15 all documents that are
secured through the local agents of the smuggling network in a ‘travel agency’. Finally
passports may be collected on arrival by a member of the smuggling ring and sent back
to Jordan for alteration and reuse.16
                                                
15 To deliver a visa, most Western consulates ask for bank statements over several months. Therefore,
migrants pay the agents who open an account in their names in a Jordanian bank and have it run for at
least 3 to 4 months. The process is therefore rather long to obtain all the needed documents before the
visa application can be launched.
16 Migrants have to follow routes set up by smugglers but their final destination country is not
necessarily that of first arrival. For example, there is a route to Germany by plane, but once there the20
Whereas some of the networks that operate in Jordan with transnational ramifications do
not seem to have connections with organized crime, and some Iraqis are involved at the
highest level for humanitarian reasons, others are clearly connected to prostitution as a
number of interviews I was able to conduct with Iraqi women in Amman demonstrate.
Bogus travel agencies offer Iraqi women who come to inquire about the costs of the trip
to ‘employ’ them as prostitutes until they have earned an amount of money considered
sufficient to pay for their (and often family members’) smuggling out of Jordan. A
number of work hours is determined in advance, the money earned is held in trust by the
pimp who releases the women and provides them with travel documents only after they
have found other women to replace them. There is no need for physical intimidation or
isolation strategies as Iraqi women are already isolated, have nowhere to escape to, and
cannot turn to the authorities. Besides they enter into these bonds ‘voluntarily’ in the
absence of other survival means. From the literature on women trafficking, there is no
other evidence of this debt-bondage being exerted in the transit country and not in the
destination country. Generally, traffickers are said to exploit the migrant after being
transported across the border, and in the case of prostitution, it is single young women
who are involved (Salt and Hogarth 2000: 62; Skeldon 2000: 7). In Jordan, on the other
hand, it is mainly women with children or ageing parents, and who are single heads of
households.
The fact is that very few of those who recourse to smugglers have the several thousands
dollars required. They have to borrow from friends and relatives who are already abroad
and rarely from one single source. Families can rarely support the cost for all their
members at once, and a strategic choice has to be made of whom to send first.
Frequently, male heads of households travel ahead of the family not only for
reconnaissance purposes but also because they leave their spouses and children as
guarantees to the smugglers in Jordan until they are able to repay the entire cost of their
own trip. But some families chose to send first the wife or a teenage child as they are
the most likely to obtain fast recognition of their claim for asylum in the West and can
then ask to be reunited with family members left in Jordan.
Because of the costs of irregular migration, Jordan is also a nexus of smuggling rings
and social networks. All types of social networks support the move of asylum seekers
into the West: kinship networks, political parties, co-ethnics, co-religionists, etc. In the
illegal migration process ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ networks (Tilly 1990) intersect,
                                                                                                                                              
Iraqi migrant manages on her/his own or with family members who come to meet her/him at the
airport to reach Denmark, Sweden or the Netherlands where asylum conditions are seen as more
favourable or where s/he has relatives or friends. In case the migrant aims at North America, he
mainly uses Jordan to buy a passport. The most expensive ones are in decreasing order those of Saudi
Arabia, Greece and Cyprus that all permit to travel to Canada without prior visa application.
Alternatively, the migrant does not need to resort to facilitators or smugglers within Jordan but later
on as s/he can travel to a couple of Central American countries that have lax entry requirements and
then reach the two main routes to the United States either across Mexico or by boat through the
Caribbean. Finally, those who prefer to go to Australia can board a plane from Amman to Malaysia or
Indonesia. Both are Moslem countries and do not require visas from most nationals of Arab countries
(this has changed after 11 September 2001, Australia having successfully called on Indonesia to
require visas for nationals from Iraq and Afghanistan). From there, migrants are smuggled by boat to
Java and Australia. Those who have failed can always turn to UNHCR’s regional office in Bangkok to
seek asylum, or contact the smuggling rings there that have specialized in providing high quality
documents to Chinese migrants, often stolen from one of the 7 million tourists the country receives
every year (Skeldon 2000: 24).21
together with religious and smuggling networks who both have a transnational scope. I
have explored more particularly those of the Shiite community, which might provide an
example of how other transnational religious organizations support the move of
migrants. The Shiite majlis I have mentioned above are places where information is
exchanged on the best way to migrate to the West: how to buy a foreign passport or get
a Western visa, how much it costs, how to contact smugglers or forgers, which are the
best countries to migrate to in terms of entry requirements and asylum procedures, what
are the easiest routes, etc. Members who have relatives already in the West keep
contacts with them by phone or the Internet and pass on details to those attending the
meetings. Young clergymen play a pivotal role in mobilizing financial resources for the
members of the community who wish to migrate. Financial networks have vast
ramifications. Money might be collected through campaigns in Iran among Shiite co-
religionists and relatives who have looked for asylum there. The two main Iraqi Shiite
political parties in exile are based in Teheran, and so are several private foundations that
channel the funds to UK, which has become, in the 1990s, a major centre of learning
and cultural activity for the Shiites.17 Funds are then either re-channel to Jordan or
directly transferred to members of the smuggling ring in the West. Clergymen have a
priority in benefiting from financial help to migrate, especially if they have no chance of
obtaining refugee status through UNHCR. But like the women forced into prostitution,
their departure is made conditional on the arrival of colleagues from Iraq to replace
them in order for the majlis not to disintegrate. After being recipients of financial aid,
members who have migrated to the West may remain in the networks by operating at a
different level, that of information gathering and collection of funds.
The role of social and smuggling networks is thus essential in facilitating and sustaining
migrations to the West. It is through these networks that migrants gather information,
money and by-pass strict entry requirements. But the two types of networks also overlap
either because relatives or co-ethnics are the smugglers, or because one or several
elements (money, documents) in the overall process are better obtained through a
network other than the one which organizes the smuggling.
Jordan is a first step that prepares migrants for their future situation in industrialized
countries. It is both an antechamber and a training site. In Jordan, migrants will gain
access to information about the settings in potential reception countries and they will
make a choice, elaborate a strategy. They will also get used to the problems they will
face in the West, though less acutely: free movement and integration in the work
market, the quest for asylum and illegality.
                                                
17 In particular, this is the case of the Khû’i foundation, a welfare established in 1988 in Najaf (Iraq) by
Ayatollah Khû’i, with branches in Iran. It transferred its headquarters to London in 1991 and has an
important network of schools and charities all over the world, including a special welfare programme
for refugees. Moreover, it is now well established in Indonesia where it provides support to stranded
Shiites (Iraqis, Afghans and Iranians) who have not managed to reach Australia.22
4 Conclusion
Changing focus to observe how and why asylum migrants merely transit in states
neighbouring their home countries instead of using them as long term havens challenges
the accepted views that migrants who move irregularly to industrialized states had the
initial intention to do so, and that mobilization and recruitment necessarily take place in
the country of origin.
The case of Iraqi forced migrants transiting Jordan illustrates that, for a variety of
cultural and practical reasons, a majority of asylum migrants who eventually reach the
West irregularly would rather stay in host countries close to their state of origin. It also
shows that intercontinental trends of asylum migration cannot be fully understood
without looking at a set of interrelated issues in the first countries of reception: their
cultural proximity or distance with the country of origin of the migrants, geo-strategic
concerns, domestic policies, administrative/legal deficiencies in the treatment of these
migrants, discriminatory practices by the authorities or other social agents. These are all
factors that can lead to the migrants’ poor socio-economic and security conditions, and
prompt them to continue emigration towards Western industrialized states where they
expect better protection and opportunities.
Furthermore, ethnic and religious affiliations remain primary factors explaining both the
discrimination and the survival strategies of asylum migrants in regional host countries
in the middle eastern context, and further migration dynamics are strongly dependant on
the functioning of transnational networks based on these very affiliations that are not
criminal by nature, even if smuggling is involved. The patterns of transit migration
across Jordan confirm that ‘(…) international migrants travel along familiar avenues,
circumscribed by strong linkages within or evolving within migration systems and by
the example set by earlier movers and the support structures established by them’ (Faist
2000: 76). Social capital is Iraqi migrants’ main asset, and among the various
components of this capital, kinship and religious ties appear to be those mobilized in
priority because they have already gained a transnational dimension. Interestingly
enough, these are not activated so much from Iraq as from Jordan, a fact that supports
the idea that transnational social mechanisms need such vectors as globalized
information, financial and transportation systems.
Once the mechanism is set in motion, it results in the type of chain migration described
by Faist: ‘The more immigrants of a given place stay in the destination region, the more
want to come’ (2000: 152-153). But this dynamic has to be supported by a readiness to
migrate which, in the case of Iraqi forced migrants, is created not only by the socio-
political conditions at home, but also by the type of reception they receive in
neighbouring states in their region of origin.23
References
Al-Rasheed, M. (1998). Iraqi Assyrian Christians in London: The Construction of
Ethnicity. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Amnesty International (1997). Fear, Flight and Forcible Exile: Refugees in the Middle
East. London: Amnesty International.
Barth, F. (ed.) (1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Bigo, D. (1996). Polices en réseau, l’expérience européenne. Paris: Presses de
Sciences Po.
Chatelard, G. (1997). ‘Les chrétiens de Jordanie: entre appartenance communautaire et
identité nationale’. Les Cahiers de l’Orient, quatrième trimestre, No. 48.
Chatelard, G. (2002). ‘Incentives to Transit: Policy Responses to Influxes of Iraqi
Forced Migrants in Jordan’. Working Paper. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
Crisp, J., and N. Van Hear (1998). ‘Refugee Protection and Immigration Control:
Addressing the Asylum Dilemma’. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 17 (3).
Doraï, M. K. (2002). Palestinian Emigration from Lebanon to Northern Europe:
Transnational Migratory Networks and Patterns of Solidarity. Paper presented at the
Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, 20-24 March
2002. Florence: Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, European University Institute.
Engbersen, G, and J. van der Lun (1998). ‘Illegality and Criminality: The Differential
Opportunity Structure of Undocumented Migrants’, in K. Koser, and H. Lutz (eds),
The New Migration in Europea. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Faist, T. (2000). The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and
Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ghosh, B. (1998). Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insight into Irregular
Migration, International Organization for Migration. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Gonzalez, N. L., and C. S. McCommon (eds) (1989). Conflict, Migration and the
Expression of Ethnicity. Boulder: Westview Press.
IOM (December 1995). Transit Migration in Turkey, Migration Information
Programme. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
IOM (August 1994). Transit Migration in Ukraine, Migration Information Programme.
Hungary: International Organization for Migration.
Koser, K., and H. Lutz (eds) (1998). The New Migration in Europe. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Koser, K. (1997). ‘Negotiating Entry into Fortress Europe: The Migration Strategies of
“Spontaneous” Asylum Seekers’, in P. Muus (ed.), Exclusion and Inclusion of
Refugees in Contemporary Europe. Utrecht: ERCOMER, pp. 157–170.24
Koslowski, R. (2000). ‘The Mobility Money Can Buy: Human Smuggling and Border
Control in the European Union’, in P. Andreas, and T. Snyder (eds), The Wall
Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and
Europe. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 203–218.
LCHR (April 1992). Asylum under Attack. Report on the Protection of Iraqi Refugees
and Displaced Persons one Year after the Humanitarian Emergency in Iraq. New
York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
Le Roy, J. (2001). ‘Statistical Outline of the Situation of the South Iraqi Refugees in
Iran, including the Marsh Dwellers’, in Iraqi Marshlands: Prospects, First Drafts of
Papers presented at the Conference on the AMAR International Charitable
Foundation, London, 21 May 2001.
McDowell, C. (1997). A Tamil Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and
Politics in Switzerland. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Meese, J., K. Van Impe, and S. Venheste (1998). Multidisciplinary Research on the
Phenomenon of Trafficking in Human Beings from an International and National
Perspective: A Pilot Study with Poland and Hungary. Ghent: University of Ghent.
Morrison, J. (1998). The Cost of Survival: The Trafficking of Refugees to the UK.
London: Refugee Council.
Muus, P. (ed.) (1997). The Exclusions and Inclusions of Refugees in Contemporary
Europe. Utrecht: ERCOMER.
Peter, A. (2000). Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Portes, A. (ed.) (1995). The Economic Sociology of Immigration. Essays on Networks,
Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Rajaee, B. (2000). ‘The Politics of Refugee Policy in Post-Revolutionary Iran’. The
Middle East Journal, 54 (1): 44–63.
Salt, J., and J. Hogarth (2000). Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe: A
review of the Evidence with Case Studies from Hungary, Poland and Ukraine.
Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
Salt, J., and J. Stein (1997). ‘Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking’.
International Migration, 35 (4).
Skeldon, R. (January 2000). ‘Myths and Realities of Chinese Irregular Migration’,
Migration Research Series. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
Snyder, T. (2000). ‘Conclusion: The Wall Around the West’, in P. Andreas, and
T. Snyder (eds), The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls
in North America and Europe. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 219–
227.
Tilly, C. (1990). ‘Transplanted Networks’, in V. Yans MacLaughlin (ed.), Immigration
Reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–95.
UNHCR (1996). Background Paper on Iraqi Refugees and Asylum Seekers, Center for
Documentation and Research. Geneva: UNHCR.25
United Nations (2000). Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, United Nations, Geneva.
USCR (July 1991). Mass Exodus: Iraqi Refugees in Iran, Issue Brief, US Committee for
Refugees, Washington, DC.
USCR (1991 to 2001). Jordan Country Report, US Committee for Refugees,
Washington, DC.
USCR (1996). World Refugee Survey. An Annual Assessment of Conditions Affecting
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Displaced, US Committee for Refugees,
Washington, DC.
USDS (1991 to 2001). Jordan Country Report, Human Right Practices Reports, Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, US Department of State, Washington, DC.
Van Hear, N. (1995). ‘The Impact of the Involuntary Mass “Return” to Jordan in the
Wake of the Gulf Crisis’, International Migration Review, 29 (2).
Van Hear, N. (1998). New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of
Migrant Communities. London: UCL Press.
Vertovec, S., and R. Cohen (eds) (1999). Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism.
Chelthenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.